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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Respondent,

:

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

vs.

:

Case No. 21028

RICHARD LAWRENCE JENSEN,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

:

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a conviction for the offense of
Aggravated Robbery, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah
Code Annotated, §76-6-302(1)(a)(1953
Judicial District

Court in and

as amended),

in the Third

for Salt Lake County, State of

Utah, the Honorable Judith M. Billings, Judge, Presiding.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Appellant was charged by information with the offense of
Aggravated Robbery, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah
Code Annotated

§76-6-302(1)(a) (1953 as amended).

tried to a jury on June 5th and 6th, 1985.

The case was

On June 6th, 1985,

the jury returned a verdict of guilty as charged in the information.

On October 21st, 1985, appellant was ordered to serve an

indeterminate sentence of five years to life in the Utah State
Prison, in addition to a one year enhancement for the use of a
weapon.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks an order from this court reversing the
judgment and conviction rendered against him, and remanding this

case to the Third Judicial District Court for a new trial, or in
the alternative for dismissal,
ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
The issue presented in this appeal is: was the admission
at trial of evidence of other bad acts or crimes contained in
letters written by the appellant prejudicial to him, thereby requiring a reversal of his conviction?
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The state called Mr. Harry Leisure as its first witness
at trial.

Mr. Leisure testified that on February llthr 1985, he

was employed by the Radio Shack Company (R. 150). Mr,
indicated that at approximately

7:45

Leisure

p.m. that night, he was

robbed by a suspect who he later identified as the appellant.
(R. 151).
When the suspect first entered the store Mr. Leisure and
one other customer, Jeff Treseder, were the only persons present.
(R. 151). Mr. Leisure initially approached the suspect and asked
if he could assist him.
"just looking".

(R. 151). The suspect said that he was

(R. 151-152).

Mr.

Leisure indicated at this

point he looked into the suspect's face at a distance of approximately two feet (R. 151).
A few minutes later, after Mr. Treseder had left, the
suspect approached the sales counter, showed a gun, and told Mr.
Leisure to empty the cash drawer (R. 152). Mr. Leisure described
the suspect as being approximately six feet to six feet one and
one-half inches tall and weiqhing approximately 240-245 pounds.
(R. 160).

After identifying appellant in open court (R. 155) f Mr.
Leisure stated that he had seen a photograph of appellant approximately three or four days after the robbery (R. 171). However,
he also admitted

that he had seen a photograph of someone else

who looked familiar (R. 175-176).
Jeff Treseder then testified and confirmed that he had
seen the suspect in the store on February 11th (R. 191). However,
he could not identify appellant either in court or after having
been shown a photograph
Ondrak testified

that

of him

he

had

(R. 195).

shown

Later, Deputy Daryl

Mr. Treseder

a

number

of

photographs and that he picked out a person other than appellant,
who "most closely resembled" the suspect (R. 215).
After the state

rested, defense counsel

called

Harris* to the stand as an alibi witness (R. 244).

Terry

Miss Harris

testified that she had met appellant in January and worked with
him during the months of January and February, 1985.

(R. 245).

During this time, Miss Harris and appellant became involved in a
boyfriend-girlfriend type relationship (p.. 245).
She stated, with

relation to this

incident, that she

and appellant were together at his apartment during the entire
evening of February 11th (R. 249-250).

She also testified that,

after appellant was arrested for the instant offense, she received
numerous letters from him (R. 252).

1. This witness had originally been called by the state to
identify appellant's baseball cap, which had been seized by
police officers when he was arrested.
(See Record, pages 225230).
3

Subsequently, the state moved for the admission of one
of these letters2 (R. 275-272).
letter being admitted.

Defense counsel objected to the

However, at this point

in time, both

defense counsel and counsel for the state had a discussion at the
bench, the contents of which were not recorded (R. 276). After
this discussion was completed, the state then moved again for
introduction of the letter, and defense counsel again objected
"for reasons given".

(R.

276). The court then noted the objec-

tion and admitted the letter without further comment (R. 276).
Later on, the state moved for admission of a second
letter^, which was objected to by defense counsel for the same
reason "as before".

(R. 284). The letter was also received by

the court (R. 284).
After both sides rested and the jury had been instructed
and had retired to deliberate, defense counsel indicated it was
her understanding that these two letters were not in fact going
to the jury.

(R. 397).

The court responded by stating that

counsel had misconstrued the ruling.

(R. 397). However, counsel

then noted that she had understood that these letters would not
go to the jury room because one of them contained information
pertaining to appellant's apparent commitment on a separate and
unrelated offense arising out of Davis County.

(R. 397).

Finally,

the court instructed defense counsel that she should have made
the objection at the time the letters were admitted, thus her

2.
3.

This letter was identified as state's exhibit
addendum).
This letter was identified as state's exhibit #17.

#16

(see

objection was not timely (R. 400). However, the record does in
fact indicate that the objections were made at the proper time.
The confusion arises from the fact that counsel apparently assumed,
after the discussion at the bench, that the letters, because of
their prejudicial content, were being admitted on the condition
that these prejudicial matters would not be shown to the jury.
After deliberating for just over four hours, the jury
returned a verdict

of

guilty

as

charged

in the information.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
It is appellant's contention

that the trial court's

admission of the letter in the instant case constituted reversible
error.

Because the letter contained reference to another crime

or bad act on appellant's part, it had the effect of showing a
propensity to commit crime and, therefore, its admission violated
Rule 404 of the Utah Rules of Evidence.
Appellant will also argue that trial counsel did in
fact comply

with

the

"contemporaneous

objection"

rule, even

though the basis for the objection was not placed on the record
until after the jury had retired to deliberate.
ARGUMENT
This court has made it clear that evidence of prior bad
acts is not admissable for the purpose of disgracing the defendant
or showing a propensity to commit crime.

State v. Wells, Utah,

603 P.2d 810 (1979); State v. Mason, Utah, 699 P.2d 795 (1975).
In State v. Saunders, Utah, 699 P.2d 738 (Utah 1985),
the defendant was convicted of burglary, theft, possession of a

5

firearm by a restricted person, and of being a habitual criminal*
On appeal, he argued that the trial court had committed error by
refusing to sever the firearm count from the others.
In analyzing

the severance

issue, the supreme court

noted that, because of the element of "restricted personw in the
firearm offense:
evidence that defendant was at the time of
the offenses committed to the Utah State
Prison and living in a halfway house would
have been inadmissable at trial on the burglary and theft charges.
This evidence
clearly implied that defendant had committed
a prior crime. (Ld. at 741).
After noting that the evidence pertaining to the firearm
charges was not at all relevant to the other two offenses, the
court went on to explain the justification for the general principle involved:
The basis of these limitations [Rule 55 of
the former rules of evidence] on the admissibility of evidence of prior crimes is the
tendency of a fact finder to convict the
accused because of bad character rather than
because he is shown to be guilty of the
offense charged. Because of this tendency
such evidence is presumed prejudicial and,
absent a reason for the admission of the
evidence other than to show criminal disposition, the evidence is excluded. (1x3. at
741) .
Appellant submits that the facts involved in the instant
case fit squarely within the holding and rationale of Saunders.
Here, the evidence as to appellant being the robber was heavily
disputed, in that appellant presented an alibi defense in which
he testified on his own behalf and denied committing the robbery.
Also, of the two persons who observed the robber on the

night of February 11th, 1985, only one was able to identify him.
At the same time, the witness admitted that he felt he had somehow
recognized the face of another individual whose photo was shown
to him by police officers to be familiar.

With this conflict in

the evidence, it is clear that the introduction to the jury of
appellant's apparent criminal conviction in another county could
easily have caused

the jury to convict him because

of his bad

character rather than because he was shown to have been guilty of
the offense charged.
Although Saunders was decided at a time when the "old"
Rule 55 of the Utah Rules of Evidence was still in effect, appellant submits that the result would still be the same under our
new rules.
Rule 55 provided:
[E]vidence that a person committed a crime
or civil wrong on a specified occasion, is
inadmissable to prove his disposition to
commit crime or civil wrong as the basis
for an inference that he committed another
crime or civil wrong on another specified
occasion but...such evidence is admissable
when relevant to prove some other material
fact • . •
Rule 55 was superceded by the new Rule 404 of the Utah
Rules of Evidence, which became effective on September 1, 1983.
Rule 404 provides, in pertinent part:
(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts.
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is
not admissable to prove the character of a
person in order to show that he acted in
conformity therewith. It may, however, be
admissable for other purposes, such as
proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or
absence of mistake or accident.
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Appellant submits that both the old Rule 55 and the new
Rule 404 are virtually identical in following the general rule.
In addition, the

court

in Saunders did

not

indicate, either

expressly or impliedly, that cases coming before it under the new
Rule 404 will end up with a different result than the old Rule 55
cases.
In State v. Holder, Utah, 649

P.2d

583

(1984), the

defendant was convicted of theft of an operable motor vehicle.4
At trial, the state introduced evidence that the defendant and
another suspect were arrested while in possession of a vehicle
that had been reported stolen.

However, in addition, the state,

over defense counsel's objection, introduced evidence that defendant and his co-defendant had earlier been involved in an aggravated robbery while in the stolen vehicle.
In reversing the defendant's conviction and ordering a
new trial, the court held:
[T]he merely cumulative character of the
robbery evidence on the element of knowledqe
and intent regarding the theft charge is
significant because it hiqhliqhts the
limited value this evidence has when weiqhed
against the substantial possibility that a
jury would be prejudiced by evidence of
[appellant's] commission of another crime.
Such evidence of the commission of other
crimes must be used with extreme caution
because of the prejudicial effect it may
have on the finder of fact.
(at 584).
See State v. Kappas, 100 Utah 274, 2788,
114 P.2d 205, 207 (1941); State v. Anderton,
81 Utah 320, 323-24, 17 P.2d 917, 918
(1983); State v. McGowan, 66 Utah 223, 22628, 241 P 314, 315-16 (1925) .

4. This case also dealt with the "old" Rule 55 rather than the
new Rule 404.

Appellant respectfully

submits

that

the

instant

case

should be reversed as was Holder because the trial court did not
use the "extreme caution" required

in the instant case when it

allowed this knowinqly prejudicial

material to be admitted and

given to the jury.

In fact, at one point during the trial, the

court reminded the prosecutor that he would not be able to question appellant with regard to his prior misdemeanor convictions
(See Record P. 250).

Yet, it nevertheless admitted the letters

in their entirety so as to allow the jury to see what the court
had expressly forbidden the prosecutor from pursuing.
In State v. Kazda,

Utah,

382

P.2d

407

(1963),

the

defendant appealed from a jury conviction for assault with intent
to commit murder and robbery.
to elicit

from

At trial, the prosecutor was able

an F.B.I, agent

statements made

to him

by the

defendant regarding his arrest in another state for an unrelated
armed robbery.

In reversing, the supreme

court held that this

extraneous information:
implied that the defendant was implicated
in other crimes, none of them proven, and
could have no other effect than to degrade
the defendant and give to the jury the
impression that he had a propensity for
crime. See also; State v. Peterson, Utah,
457 P.2d 532 (1968); State v. Dickson, Utah,
361 P.2d 412 (1961).
Again, appellant submits that the effect of the admission of

"other

crimes"

in

the

instant

case

probably

had

the

effect of degrading the appellant and giving the jury the impression that he had a propensity for crime.
Appellant further submits that the error committed in the

9

instant case was prejudicial

thus precluding

harmless error by the state.

an assertion of

As the court stated

in Kazda,

supra, it would be difficult in the instant case to "say with any
degree of assurance that there would not have been a different
result" in the absence of such evidence.5

(JU3. at 409).

In

addition, because of the extreme danger inherent in the admission
of this type of evidence, this court has ruled that there is a
presumption of

prejudice

whenever

this

error

occurs.

(See,

Saunders, supra, at 741). For these reasons, appellant submits
that the admission of "prior bad

acts"

in the

instant case,

cloaked with the "presumption of prejudice", was in fact prejudicial and therefore entitles him to a new trial.
Finally, the remaininq

issue

in this arqument deals

with the trial court's ruling that defense counsel's objection to
the prejudicial evidence was not timely.

Therefore, the court

overruled her objection.
Rule 103 of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides, in
pertinent part:
Error may not be predicated upon a rulinq
which admits or excludes evidence unless a
substantial right of the party is affected,
and
(1) objection. In case the ruling is
one admitting evidence, a timely objection
or motion to strike appears of record,
stating the specific ground of objection,
if the specific ground was not apparent
from the context;...
In State v. McCardell, Utah, 652 P.2d 942 (1982), our

5. The Kazda court was quoting State v. Dickson, 12 Utah 2d 8,
361 P.2d 412 (1961).

supreme court dealt with the "contemporaneous objection rule".
There, the appellant's trial counsel had objected to the admission
of a number of "mug shots" on the basis that the state had not
set a proper foundation.

On appeal, it was contended that the

"mug shots" were objectionable because they were identified as
having been taken at a police station.

In addition, the reverse

sides of the photos referred to the defendant's possible involvement in other crimes.
In finding

that

the

appellant's

trial

counsel

had

failed to comply with the rule,6 the court cited and supported
the Kansas Supreme Court, which had stated that:
The contemporaneous objection rule long
adhered to in this state requires timely
and specific objection to admission of
evidence in order for the question of
admissibility to be considered on appeal.
The rule is a salutory procedural tool
serving a legitimate state purpose. By
making use of the rule, counsel gives the
trial court the opportunity to conduct the

6. The Rule of Evidence at the time McCardell was decided was
Rule 4. It provided:
A verdict of finding shall not be set aside
nor shall the judgment or decision based
thereon be reversed, by reason of the
erroneous admission of evidence unless (a)
there appears of record objection to the
evidence timely interposed and so stated as
to make clear the specific ground of objection, and (b) the court which passes
upon the effect of the error or errors is
of the opinion that the admitted evidence
should have been excluded on the ground
stated and probably had a substantial influence in bringing about the verdict or
finding. However, the court in its discretion, and in the interests of justice,
may review the erroneous admission of evidence even though the grounds of the objection thereto are not correctly stated.
11

trial without using the tainted evidence,
and thus avoid possible reversal and a new
trial. Furthermore, the rule is practically
one of necessity if litigation is ever to
end.
State v. Moore, 218 Kan. 450, 543
P.2d 923 (1975); quoting Baker v. State,
204 Kan. 607, 611, 464 P.2d 212, 216 (1970).
The McCardell court then stated that

in the instant

case there was no indication on the record that the trial court
had been in any way alerted to the prejudicial nature on the back
of the "mug shots".

Based on this omission, the court followed

the rule in refusing to hear the argument.
Appellant submits that the instant case is far different
from the facts present in McCardell.

Here, defense counsel ob-

jected to the introduction of the letters at the time they were
admitted.

When defense counsel brought up the issue after closing

argument, she indicated that the basis for her objection had been
stated at the bench.

Based on that objection, she had believed

the court's ruling would be to not allow the prejudicial evidence
to be admitted.
The record, at this point, accurately reflected what
the evidence was as well as the basis for the objection thereto.
Thus, it is clear

that defense counsel

"directed the court's

attention" to the prejudicial evidence when it was admitted.

The

only problem occurs where the basis is not actually put on the
record until after the evidence was admitted.

And

it appears

clear that the only reason for this omission was counsel's misunderstanding as to the court's ruling.
not be precluded

simply because

Surely, this issue should

the court and counsel had a

misunderstanding as to the letters' admission.

Part of the reason for the problem in this case also
originates from the nature of the questioned letters.

Because

the letters were read, for the most part, in open court, they
undoubtedly were

admissable

as

to

the

matters

so

divulged.

However, the confusion arose as to the proposed "deletion" of the
prejudicial parts

from

the

legitimately

Again, because counsel voiced

admissable

sections.

her objections at the time the

evidence was admitted and because she later was able to put her
basis for such objection on the record, she therefore complied
with the requirements of Rule 103 and the rule of McCardell.
Thus, appellant

respectfully

submits

that

this

court

should

decide the issue raised.
CONCLUSION
Appellant respectfully

requests

this

court, for the

reasons stated above, to reverse and remand this case to District
Court for a new trial, or, in the alternative, order

it to

be dismissed.
Dated this

day of May, 1986.

EARL XAIZ
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that four true and correct copies of
the foregoing Brief of Appellant were mailed/delivered

to the

Attorney General's Office, 236 Capitol Building, Salt Lake City,
Utah, 84114, on this

day of May, 1986.
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